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Introduction 
 
Lord Millett, sitting as a judge of Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, has examined and 
dissected two long-standing rules of English law concerning the acquisition of rights of 
way and other easements by long enjoyment and found them to be devoid of principle.  
His lordship declared that these rules were not part of the common law of Hong Kong 
and suggested that, were they now to be considered by the highest court of the United 
Kingdom, they would not be upheld as part of the common law of England.   
 
Both of the rules limit the scope of the law of lost modern grant, the doctrine by virtue of 
which a fiction of an actual grant of an easement is presumed by the court.  One of the 
rules is that the doctrine does not apply as between lessees holding under a common 
landlord.  The other is that the doctrine does not apply as between lessees holding under 
different landlords.  The effect of these rules is that easements can be acquired by long 
usage only by and against freeholders.  This is of acute importance in Hong Kong where 
virtually all land is leasehold. 
 
Lord Millett, in the course of delivering the principal judgment of the court, 1  also 
criticized the more general rule, from which the above rules are derived, that in order to 
acquire an easement by any form of prescription the user must be by or on behalf of the 
owner in fee simple against an owner in fee simple.  His lordship described this rule as 
counter-intuitive and contrary to the policy of the law.  Lord Millett drew upon half-a-
century of academic criticism of the authorities which form the basis of these rules and 
subjected the judgments in those authorities to withering analysis. 
 
 
Facts 
 
The second appellant, Sun Honest Development, wished to redevelop land owned by it 
under long lease from the government of Hong Kong. A lane ran between the existing 
buildings on the land and neighbouring buildings, held by others also on long lease from 
the government.  The width of the lane was half on Sun Honest’s land and half on the 
land of the neighbours.  The lane gave access to some of the buildings to vehicles and 
                                                 
1 Bokhary, Chan and Ribeiro PPJ and Mortimer NPJ agreed with Lord Millett NPJ’s judgment. 
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pedestrians and had been so used since about 1958 although there had never been a 
formal grant of a right to use the lane.  Sun Honest submitted plans to the Building 
Authority for approval to replace the existing low-rise buildings with a 40-storey building.  
Under the Buildings Ordinance prior permission to carry out building works was required 
from the Authority which could refuse permission to carry out such works on certain 
grounds.  One of those grounds was that the plans were for buildings which exceeded the 
permissible plot ratio.  This is the multiplier which, when applied to the area of the site, 
determines the maximum permitted gross floor area of a planned building and is laid 
down in regulations made under the ordinance.  Consequently the area of the site dictated 
the size of the new building.   
 
The Building Authority rejected Sun Honest Development’s plans on the ground that the 
proposed buildings exceeded the permissible plot ratio.  In calculating that ratio the 
Authority had deducted from the area of the site that part of the lane which fell within the 
boundaries of the site.  The justification for doing so was that under the regulations a 
street or service lane was to be left out of account if it was subject to a public or private 
right of way.  The Authority considered the lane to be subject to a right of way in favour 
of occupants of the neighbouring buildings which right had been acquired by application 
of the doctrine of lost modern grant. 
 
The developer appealed to the Buildings Appeal Tribunal, arguing that the deduction was 
wrongful in that the doctrine could not apply since the land in question was leasehold and 
that both the dominant and servient tenements were held from a common landlord, 
namely the government.  The tribunal refused the appeal, holding that the doctrine did 
apply to leaseholds and that the occupiers of the neighbouring buildings had acquired a 
right of way over the lane by long usage.  On judicial review, the Court of First Instance 
of the High Court upheld the tribunal’s decision.2  An appeal to the Court of Appeal 
brought the same result.3  The developer then appealed to the Court of Final Appeal. 
 
 
Issues and decision 
 
The issue on final appeal concerning the right of way was therefore whether the rule of 
English law that the doctrine of lost modern grant does not apply as between leaseholders 
holding under a common landlord, sometimes referred to as “the rule in Kilgour v 
Gaddes”, represented or should continue to represent the law of Hong Kong.  
Consideration of this, however, inevitably led to consideration of the more general and 
prior rule that an easement can be acquired by prescription only by the owner of the 
freehold against the owner of the freehold. 
 
The answer of the Court of Final Appeal was that the more general rule was based on 
obiter dicta in a line of authority that was deeply flawed, being based on the false 
premise that lost modern grant is a form of common law prescription.  The dicta “cannot 
stand against a powerful tide of logical and academic criticism” and the rule should not 
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 2
be adopted in Hong Kong, Lord Millett said.  This condemnation of the greater rule also 
deprived the rule in Kilgour v Gaddes of logical foundation.  The court was of the 
opinion that the latter rule was not, and may never have been, part of Hong Kong law; not 
only was it inapplicable to local circumstances but the reasoning in the cases that led to 
the rule was flawed.  There was no reason in principle that a right of way or other 
easement should not be acquired by long enjoyment on the part of a lessee of the 
dominant tenement against servient land held under lease from the same landlord, 
provided that no prejudice is caused to the reversion of the common landlord.  
Furthermore, Lord Millett added, “I doubt whether either of the two rules of law under 
discussion would be upheld in England were they to be examined by the House of Lords”.  
 
 
Analysis 
 
Although it was forming during the nineteenth century, the idea that a leaseholder could 
neither acquire nor give an easement by operation of the doctrine of lost modern grant did 
not crystallize until the early twentieth century.  In 1902 Channell J described lost 
modern grant as ‘a most useful doctrine’ that could be applied between lessees where 
there was difficulty in applying the statutes of prescription and limitation owing to the 
freeholder not being bound. 4   The courts in Ireland, a jurisdiction in which the 
landholding system was predominantly leasehold, had determined that a tenant of one 
landlord could acquire an easement by long user from the tenant of another landlord and 
also from the tenant of the same landlord.5  Then in February 1904 Kilgour v Gaddes was 
decided by the Court of Appeal.6   
 
Gaddes and Kilgour were both fixed-term tenants of the same landlord in Longtown, 
Cumberland.  Gaddes used to go onto Kilgour’s land to fetch water from a pump there.  
Kilgour sued for trespass; Gaddes claimed a right under section 2 of the Prescription Act 
1832 to use the pump arising from 40 years’ user.  Collins MR said that such a right 
could not be acquired by one tenant against another but must be acquired by the owner of 
the fee of the one tenement against the owner of the fee of the other tenement.  This is the 
wider basis for the decision, described by Lord Millett as “the fee simple rule”.  There 
was also a narrower basis for the decision, that where two tenements are held by tenants 
from the same landlord, prescription does not apply because possession of the tenant of 
the land demised to him is the possession of the landlord and acquisition of an easement 
by a tenant would be a violation of first principles of the law of easements which require 
that there be two tenements in separate possession, one dominant and the other servient.  
This reasoning was adopted from earlier decisions.7 Nevertheless (and despite the fact 
that it is not the only rule enunciated in the case), this became known as the rule in 
Kilgour v Gaddes: where estates in fee simple are both in common ownership, tenants 
cannot prescribe one against the other for easements under any circumstances because 
                                                 
4 East Stonehouse UDC v Willoughby Brothers Ltd [1902] 2 KB 318 
5 Beggan v McDonald 2 LR Ir 560; Hanna v Pollock [1900] 2 IR 664. 
6 [1904] 1 KB 457 
7 Gayford v Moffatt LR 4 Ch 133 (Lord Cairns);  Timmons v Hewitt 22 LR Ir 627 (Palles CB) 
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there must be separate dominant and servient tenements.  Lord Millett called it ‘the 
common landlord rule’. 
 
What led Collins MR to the view that only the fee simple owner could prescribe for an 
easement was the notion that prescription presumes that a grant has been made of a 
permanent right at some time in the past.  Being a permanent right, the owner of the fee 
simple will be bound by it; and to be bound by it, he must have been in a position to 
contest the use and have not done so.  If it were his tenant, rather than the fee simple 
owner himself, who allowed the use, the latter could not prevent the use and might not 
even know about it. 
 
But the presumption of a permanent right arises only in the case of common law 
presumption, that is to say user since time immemorial, taken to be the year of the 
accession of King Richard I, 1189.  It does not arise in the case of statutory prescription, 
that is to say under the 1832 Act which reduces the period of user which must be shown 
to 20, or in certain cases 40, years.  Nor does it apply to lost modern grant which is a 
doctrine invented and developed by judges by which the court deduces from prolonged 
user in more recent times that there must have been a grant.  Since Kilgour v Gaddes was 
a case of statutory prescription, what led Collins MR to think that the presumption of a 
permanent right applied to the case before him and extended also to cases of lost modern 
grant? 
 
The cause was dicta of Lindley LJ in Wheaton v Maple & Co, a case about obstruction of 
the plaintiff’s right to light by a Crown lessee of neighbouring land.  The right was 
claimed under section 3 of the Prescription Act 1832.  The Court of Appeal held that the 
section did not bind the Crown as reversioner. The court thought this vital because, as 
Lindley LJ observed: “The whole theory of prescription at common law is against 
presuming a grant or covenant not to interrupt by or with anyone but the owner in fee”.  
That was true of prescription at common law based on user since time immemorial.  If 
the use is presumed to have continued since 1189, the owner of the fee simple must 
surely be aware of and bound by it.8  But it is not true of the shorter period of use 
necessary to find a presumed grant under the statute or under the theory of lost modern 
grant. 
 
What Lindley LJ had to say about the last was: “I am not aware of any authority for 
presuming, as a matter of law, a lost grant by a lessee for years in the case of ordinary 
easements” (meaning, one supposes, common easements such as rights of way and to 
water rather than a right to light).  But, as Delaney demonstrated in a seminal article9 
published more than 50 years ago and Lord Millett has now confirmed, there were in fact 
such authorities.  So the observation was mistaken as well as not germane to the decision.  
Lindley LJ added: “I am certainly not prepared to introduce another fiction to support a 
claim to a novel prescriptive right.”  The meaning of this is obscure.  The right claimed, a 
right to light, was hardly novel and what the court was being asked to do was to 
                                                 
8 There is also the problem that in 1189 lessees were not recognized as having an interest in land: Kiralfy 
(1948) 13 Conv. (NS) 104 at 107 
9 VTH Delaney, ‘Lessees and the Doctrine of Last Grant’ (1958) 74 LQR 82 
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recognize from a period of long use that there must have been an actual grant, the usual 
fiction in cases of prescription; it was therefore not a matter of introducing another fiction 
but of applying or extending an existing one. Presumably what Lindley LJ meant was that 
he was not prepared to pretend that there had been a grant by a tenant rather than by the 
owner of the fee. 
 
In resisting the extension of prescription, including lost modern grant, to leaseholders 
Lindley LJ was in exalted company.  The origin of the suggestion that lessees may not 
prescribe for an easement is dicta in the judgment of Parke B in a case before the Court of 
Exchequer decided soon after the introduction of the 1832 Act, Bright v Walker.10  This 
concerned a disputed right of way over land held by Walker on lease from the Bishop of 
Worcester.  Bright was lessee from the bishop of neighbouring meadows at which he 
operated a wharf on the River Severn; for more than 20 years he and his predecessors had 
used a route over Walker’s land to reach a public road.  The question was whether a right 
of way had arisen by prescription under the new Act: there was no claim in lost modern 
grant.  However, Parke B suggested that the Act had altered the law not just of common 
law prescription but also of lost modern grant.  Before the Act, he said, 20 years’ 
possession would have been evidence to support a claim based on a non-existing grant 
from one termor (fixed-term tenant) to another, but since the passing of the Act, such a 
right was not given by enjoyment for 20 years – in other words, the Act changed the law 
of lost modern grant as well as that of common law prescription (use since time 
immemorial) and as a result a grant must be proved in fact and would not be assumed 
from mere long enjoyment. 
 
This obiter dictum was quite wrong for it misconceived the purpose of the Prescription 
Act 1832.  The Act was an ameliorating statute, intended to facilitate proof of length of 
enjoyment sufficient to satisfy the requirements of prescription at common law.  Instead 
of requiring proof of use since time immemorial, which was virtually impossible to 
supply, the courts would be able to accept proof of 20 (or, in certain cases, 40) years.  
The Act did not touch on the alternative method of acquiring an easement by long usage, 
lost modern grant.  This was confirmed by the House of Lords some 47 years after Bright 
v Walker had been decided.11
 
Despite these flaws in its foundations, the law as stated in Kilgour v Gaddes quickly built 
an edifice.  It was confirmed and followed without demur, and by the 1920s was 
described as well settled.12  In the second half of the twentieth century the irrationality of 
the law came to be exposed by writers: if a lessor could obtain, or accept, an easement for 
the term of his lease by actual express grant, why could he not also do so by presumed 
express grant?13  If the owner of the freehold could grant or be granted an easement, why 
could not the owner of a 999-year lease?  But when the Court of Appeal came to consider 
                                                 
10 (1834) 1 Cr M & R 211 
11 Angus v Dalton (1881) 6 App Cas 740 at 814 (Lord Blackburn); see too Cockburn CJ at (1887) 3 QBD 
85, 119 
12 Eg in Derry v Saunders [1919] 1 KB 223, CA; and by PO Lawrence J in Cory v Davies [1923] 2 Ch 95 
13 Delaney, ‘Lessees and the Doctrine of Last Grant’ (1958) 74 LQR 82; Megarry and Wade, The Law of 
Real Property (7th ed, 2008), para 28-040 and prior editions. 
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the question again in the early 1990s, Fox LJ accepted that, although the law was not 
ideal and there appeared to be no case which directly decided that there could be no lost 
modern grant by or to a person who owned a lesser estate than the fee, the dicta were to 
the contrary and were very strong and long-standing.  Lost modern grant was a form of 
prescription at common law.  The law was settled.14
 
The Law Commission’s comments on this aspect of the law in its 2008 consultation paper 
on land obligations were brief and diffident. The law was complex and somewhat rigid, 
the paper said. The commission suggested that the law should be sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate the possibility of prescriptive acquisition in relation to leasehold estates; 
under a more nuanced scheme, the easement acquired would be limited to the duration of 
the leasehold.15
 
Lord Millett in the present case recognized no such inhibitions.  The fee simple rule was 
counter-intuitive, his lordship said, because it was difficult to see why it should be 
impossible to presume a lost grant of an easement by or to a lessee for the term of his 
lease when such a grant might be made expressly.  The grant could not prejudice the 
reversion to the servient land, he explained, for the right granted would expire with the 
term of the grantor’s lease and user during the currency of the lease would not bind the 
reversion unless the reversioner knew of and acquiesced in it.  Moreover, the rule was 
contrary to the policy of the law that long-established de facto enjoyment should not be 
disturbed.16
 
The fee simple rule was based on authority rather than principle, Lord Millett explained, 
and the authorities were deeply flawed.  Statements of the rule in the leading cases were 
obiter dicta and based on the false premise that lost modern grant was merely a form of 
common law prescription.  Whilst in both common law prescription and lost modern 
grant long enjoyment gives rise to a presumption of lawful origin and the origin consists 
of a presumed grant by the owner of the servient tenement, the grant is not the same in 
the two instances.  In common law prescription the grant is presumed to have been made 
before 1189 and thus almost invariably before the commencement of any lease of the 
tenements, whilst in lost modern grant it is presumed to have been made recently, quite 
possibly during the currency of the term of a subsisting lease.17
 
As for the common landlord rule, Lord Millett observed that this was based on the 
principle that the possession of a tenant is considered to be that of his landlord.  But, 
explained his lordship, it was only the fee simple rule, requiring that any easement be 
granted by freeholder to freeholder, which prevented the presumed grant from being by 
the lessee of the servient tenement to the lessee of the dominant tenement thereby 
avoiding infringement of the fundamental principle that a man cannot have a servitude 
over his own land.  Whilst it was true that a tenant was able to exercise rights over the 
                                                 
14 Simmons v Dobson [1991] 1 WLR 720 at 724, CA.  This prompted more academic discussion: Harpum, 
[1992] CLJ 220; Sparkes, (1992) 56 Conv 167. 
15 Law Com CP 186, Easements, Covenants and Profits a Prendre, paras 4.238 – 4.245. 
16 China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), para 54 
17 China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), paras 64 and 65 
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servient tenement only because he was in possession of the dominant tenement and his 
possession was with the consent of the landlord, the tenant did not derive rights over the 
servient tenement from his landlord under his lease as part of the demised premises, nor 
did he acquire them with the landlord’s consent.  The tenant derived his rights instead 
from a separate, fictitious grant presumed from long user of land not comprised in his 
lease and did so without his landlord’s consent.18
 
Once those fallacies had been exposed, Lord Millett concluded, there was no reason in 
principle that a right of way or other easement should not be acquired by long enjoyment 
on the part of a lessee of a dominant tenement against servient land held under a lease 
from the same landlord, provided that no prejudice was caused to the reversion in the 
landlord.  If the supposed grant were presumed to have been made by a lessee of the 
servient land, the right granted could not endure for a term longer than that of his lease 
and so could not bind the reversion.  Once the fee simple rule was abandoned, the 
common landlord rule had no logical foundation.19
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The main interest in this case for English readers lies in the assertion in Lord Millett’s 
concluding remarks that “I doubt whether either of the two rules under discussion would 
be upheld in England were they to be examined by the House of Lords”.20  Such an 
assertion by a recently-retired Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, unanimously supported by 
distinguished senior judges three of them former Queen’s Counsel, commands attention 
in any circumstances; when it is accompanied by such a strong critique of the basis for 
those rules, it becomes even more convincing.  The reasoning of the Court of Final 
Appeal is, it is respectfully suggested, compelling and is welcome vindication of the 
views of Delaney, even if half-a-century late. 
 
The main interest in the case for Hong Kong is that it confirms the views of lower courts 
that the doctrine of lost modern grant supplies a basis for the acquisition of rights of way 
and other easements by and against lessees through long enjoyment.  The need for such a 
basis is evident in any society, but is more pressing in one which has been and is 
undergoing rapid development.21  There is also some pleasure in this decision in the 
proof which it provides that there is life in the common law in Hong Kong a dozen years 
after the territory’s reversion to China.22
 
Malcolm Merry 
Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong 
                                                 
18 China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), para 68 
19 China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), paras 71 and 72 
20 China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), para 86.  Of course such an examination is now literally 
impossible, the judicial House of Lords having been replaced by the Supreme Court, but we know what 
Lord Millett meant. 
21 The need is explored and the development explained by the present author in ‘Rights of Way and Long 
User: The English Restriction and the Irish Rule’ (2008) 38 HKLJ 51. 
22 The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments upon a draft of this note. 
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